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Wage and P r i c e  C0ntr0ls-GOVERNMENT CON- 
TRACTS-EXECUTIVE USE OF THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT ACT TO 
DISBAR PRIVATE FIRMS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IF WAGE 
AND PRICE STANDARDS ARE NOT FOLLOWED-AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 
618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). 
On November 1, 1978, President Carter issued Executive 
Order 12,092 (E.O. 12,092)' instructing the Council on Wage and 
Price Stability (Co~ncil)~ to establish noninflationary wage and 
price standards for the entire e~onomy.~ For workers, the order 
provides that wage increases can be no more than seven percent 
annually;' for a business, price increases must be at least 0.5 per- 
cent less than the company's recent average price in~reases.~ 
The President also ordered the chairman of the Council to mon- 
itor compliance with the standards and to publish the names of 
noncompliant busine~ses.~ 
The Executive order requires all federal contractors to cer- 
1. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 8 401 note (Supp. I11 1979). 
2. Congress created the Council on Wage and Price Stability in 1974. Council on 
Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975, 
1977, 1979), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979). The Council's major 
role under the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act is to monitor the private sector 
of the economy for inflationary wage and price developments as well as the inflationary 
impact of the programs and activities of the Federal Government. Id. 8 3(a). 
3. The Council was to refine the standards to fit various sectors of the economy. 3 
C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 8 401 note (Supp. I11 1979). The Council first 
published a series of proposed wage and price standards on November 7, 1978. 43 Fed. 
Reg. 51,938 (1978). After public comments and clarification, the final wage and price 
standards were issued by the Council on December 28, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,772 (1978). 
Later modifications and additions to the wage and price standards were issued on Janu- 
ary 25, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 5336 (1979); February 13, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 9582 (1979); 
March 23, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,910 (1979); and April 20, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,776 
(1979) (current versions at  6 C.F.R. §§ 705-705.78 (1980)). 
4. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 5 401 note (Supp. I11 1979). 
5. Id. The requirement seeks to ensure that a company will not be able to increase 
prices faster than its past average of price increases. Some of the exceptions to the gen- 
eral standards program include an optional modified price standard for the wholesale 
and retail trade industry and the food manufacturing and processing industries, 6 C.F.R. 
$5 705.42-.43 (1980), and a profit margin limitation standard for companies that have 
uncontrollable costs or that cannot calculate their average price change, id. 5 705.6. 
6. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 5 401 note (Supp. I11 1979). The Pres- 
ident also ordered the Council to publish procedures to be used in Council proceedings 
relating to the standards, and to "take such other action as may be necessary and consis- 
tent with the purposes of [section 1-101 of the order]". Id. 
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tify their compliance with the wage and price standards7 and di- 
rects the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to imple- 
ment sanctions against contractors who fail to comply.' On 
January 4, 1979, OFPP promulgated a policy statement, effec- 
tive February 15, 1979, providing that noncompliant contractors 
and first-tier subcontractors whose contracts exceed five million 
dollarsa may be subject to contract termination, equitable reduc- 
tion of the contract price, and ineligibility for future government 
contracts. lo 
On March 31,1979, the AFL-CIO challenged E.O. 12,092 in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia as an unlaw- 
ful interference with the right to bargain collectively and as an 
Executive usurpation of congressional powers. The district court 
granted the labor organization's motion for summary judgment 
on the latter ground and enjoined the enforcement of the pro- 
curement compliance program." That injunction was stayed 
pending the outcome of the expedited appeal to the US. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court of appeals, 
sitting en bane, reversed the order of the district court, vacated 
its injunction, and held that section 205(a) of the 1949 Federal 
Procurement Act (FPASA)12 granted authority to the President 
to issue E.O. 12,092.lS 
7. The Executive order directs the head of each executive agency and military de- 
partment to require all federal contractors to certify that they are in compliance with the 
wage and price standards. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 5 401 note (Supp. 
I11 1979). An Office of Federal Procurement Policy letter also requires contracts exceed- 
ing $5 million to state that the contractor intends to comply with the standards. 44 Fed. 
Reg. 1229-30 (1979). 
8. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 5 401 note (Supp. I11 1979). 
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 1229 (1979). The statement also stated that as the OFPP gained 
experience with the compliance program, contracts worth less than five million dollars 
might be included. Id. The present compliance program should cover 65-70 percent of all 
Federal Government contracts, approximately $50 billion. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 
784, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). 
10. 44 Fed. Reg. 1229, 1230 (1979). A contract termination or finding of ineligibility 
for future government contracts and subcontracts can be waived if: (1) the agency's need 
for the product or service is essential to national security or public safety; (2) such an 
action would cause severe financial hardship and threaten the contractor's or subcontrac- 
tor's ability to survive; or (3) the contractor or subcontractor comes into compliance and 
agreea to an equitable reduction of the contract price. Id. at 1231. 
11. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 90, 102 (D.D.C.), vacated, 618 F.2d 784 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). 
12. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 5 205(a), 40 U.S.C. 8 
486(a) (1976). 
13. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 
(1979). 
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An Executive order is a Presidential command that the 
Government or citizens act in a specified manner. The order has 
no legal effect unless authorized by some constitutional or statu- 
tory provision.14 Most Executive orders are founded upon spe- 
cific congressional auth~rization,'~ although the courts in rare 
circumstances have found them to be authorized by the Consti- 
tution? The courts in recent years have found broad authority 
in FPASA17 for the President to issue diverse Executive orders, 
including use of the Act to uphold antidiscrimination orders? 
A. History of FPASA 
1. Legislative Enactment of FPASA 
In 1949 Congress enacted FPASA1@ to centralize federal 
government procurement and property management functions. 
The House floor manager and sponsor of the bill, Representative 
Holifield, explained the purpose of FPASA as follows: 
This bill [FPASA] establishes a basis for a plan to simplify 
the procurement, utilization, and disposal of Government 
property, and to reorganize certain agencies of the Govern- 
ment, and for other purposes. 
The major purpose of this bill is to provide for a uniform 
system of property management and supply for the entire Fed- 
eral Go~ernment .~~ 
Section 205(a) of FPASA authorizes the Preadent to "effec- 
tuate the provisions of said Act" in a manner "not inconsistent 
with" the Act?' Representative Holifield also commented on the 
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
15. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 
264, 273 n.5 (1974); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); United States v. Kelly, 342 U.S. 
193 (1952). On occasion, subsequent legislation has ratified an earlier order. Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); 
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 
F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
16. See, eg., Jenkins v. Collard, 145 US. 546 (1892); Lapeyre v. United States, 84 
U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873). 
17. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,40 U.S.C. 55 471-514 
(1976). 
18. See notes 24-34 and accompanying text infra. 
19. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377 
(current version at 40 U.S.C. 55 471-514 (1976)). 
20. 95 CONC. REC. 7441 (1949). 
21. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 5 205(a), 40 U.S.C. 5 
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scope of section 205(a): 
Continuing in this vein we see that property management af- 
fects every executive agency and so the bill expressly autho- 
rizes the President, himself, to prescribe policies and direc- 
tives, and specifies that these Presidential policies and 
directives shall govern-not merely guide-not only the Ad- 
ministrator but all executive agencies in carrying out these 
property-management  function^?^ 
Nevertheless, there are specific limitations on the Presi- 
dent's authority: the President may not affect existing "stabili- 
zation" programs. Section 502(d) of FPASA provides: 
Nothing in this Act shall impair or affect any authority of . . . 
(2)  any executive agency with respect to any phase (including, 
but not limited to, procurement . . .) of any program con- 
ducted for purposes of resale, price support, grants to farmers, 
stabilization, transfer to foreign governments, or foreign aid, 
relief, or rehabilitation . . . . ss 
2. Executive Antidiscrimination Orders and FPASA 
In recent cases the courts have found authority in FPASA 
for Executive antidiscrimination orders. The FPASA contains 
the goals of "economy" and "efficiency" in federal government 
procurement? and some courts have stated that the Executive 
antidiscrimination orders are valid because they promote "econ- 
omy" and "efficiency." The first two courts to suggest this pro- 
position did so by way of dictqg5 a court in a subsequent case 
486(a) (1976). 
22. 95 CONG. REC. 7441 (1949) (emphasis added). 
23. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 502(d), 40 U.S.C. 
474 (1976) (emphasis added). 
24. Id. § 201(a), 40 U.S.C. 481(a) (1976). 
25. In Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964), the court did not 
reach the issue but commented that the 
Defendant does not contend that the requiring of non-discrimination provi- 
sions in government contracts is beyond the power of Congress. . . . In view of 
the above quoted subsections of 205 [of FPASA] and the declaration of pol- 
icy by Congress in § 2 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, and its amend- 
ments, SO U.S.C.A. App. $ 2062, we have no doubt that the applicable execu- 
tive orders and regulations have the force of law. 
Id. at  8. 
In Farkas v. Texas Instrument Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
977 (1967), the court noted in dictum, 
We would be hesitant to say that the antidiscrimination provisions of Execu- 
tive Order No. 10,925 are so unrelated to the establishment of "an economical 
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held so directlyeM 
The first case to directly face the issue of whether FPASA 
could support an Executive antidiscrimination order was Con- 
tractors Association v. Secretary of Labor.27 In this case the 
Third Circuit affirmed the validity of the aftirmative action 
"Philadelphia Plan" issued pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 
(E.O. 11,246):8 stating that the antidiscrimination provisions 
"would seem to be authorized by the broad grant of procure- 
ment [FPASA] authority?@ The court explained that there was 
a connection between the Executive order and the FPASA goals 
of economy and efficiency because it "is in the interest of the 
United States . . . to see that its suppliers are not over the long 
run increasing its costs and delaying its programs by excluding 
from the labor pool available minority workmen."80 
In United States v. New Orleans Public Service Inc.,.l the 
Fifth Circuit commented that the same antidiscrimination order 
that was involved in Contractors Associations2 was valid on the 
basis of FPASA even though a utility company questioned Pres- 
idential authority to condition federal contracts upon compli- 
ance with equal employment requirements.'. The court also 
noted that the order was valid because it was congruent with the 
congressional intent embodied in both title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
and efficient system for . . . the procurement and supply" of property and ser- 
vices, 40 U.S.C.A. 5 471 [FPASA], that the order should be treated as issued 
without statutory authority. Indeed, appellees make no such challenge to its 
validity. 
Id. a t  632 n.1. Both Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.18 (7th 
Cir. 1975) and Northeast Constr. Co. v. Rommey, 485 F.2d 752, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
suggest broad authority to achieve social and economic goals through federal procure- 
ment controls. Northeast indicates that if executive or congressional programs promote 
Federal procurement considerations of economy, then FPASA can uphold the programs. 
485 F.2d a t  760-61. For a discussion of the limitations of Rossetti and Northeast, see 
AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 95-6 & n.15 (D.D.C.), vacated, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). 
26. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 854 (1971). 
27. Id. 
28. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation) as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375,3 
C.F.R. 684 (1969), superceded in part by Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1969), 
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. (1976). 
29. 442 F.2d a t  170. 
30. Id. 
31. 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978). 
32. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
33. 553 F.2d a t  465-67. 
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of 1972?' 
Nevertheless, in United States u. East Texas Motor Freight 
System, I ~ C . , ~ ~  the Fifth Circuit limited the scope of the antidis- 
crimination orders. The court held that the antidiscrimination 
order, E.O. 11,246, could not invalidate a seniority system that 
was lawful under title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The court ob- 
served that title VII's exemption for bona fide seniority systems 
was a statement of congressional intent, and that "[tlhe Execu- 
tive may not, in defiance of such policy, make unlawful-or pe- 
nalize-a bona fide seniority system. w~ 
These court rulings suggest that FPASA has been used to 
uphold the validity of Executive antidiscrimination orders; how- 
ever, East Texas limits the application of an Executive order to 
the extent it is found that Congress has expressed a contrary 
intent regarding the specific subject matter." With this principle 
' in mind, it is necessary to examine congressional actions in the 
area of wage and price regulations. 
B. History of Wage and Price Regulation 
Congress has at various times authorized the President to 
enforce wage and price controls. In each case the authority to 
control wages and prices with economic sanctions was carefully 
monitored by Congress. Congress enacted the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 194Zm .to regulate prices for government con- 
tracts;ss the Stabilization Act of 1942, which amended the Emer- 
34. Id. at  467. 
35. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977). 
36. Id. at  185. 
37. Justice Jackson discussed the validity of Presidential actions and Executive or- 
ders in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., con- 
curring), by noting, "[wlhen the President takes measures incompatible with the ex- 
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at  its lowest ebb." Id. at 637. The 
Youngstown analysis of the President's authority, as explained in United States v. New 
Orleans Public Service, Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 
US. 942 (1978), implies that an Executive order program would not be valid if there was 
a congressional statute which was inconsistent with the Executive order. See id. at  467 
n.8. See also AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 810-11 (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., dis- 
senting), cert. denied, 443 US. 916 (1979); Adequacy of the Adrninistmtion's Anti-Infla- 
tion Program (Part 1): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern- 
ment Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 494 (1979) (Congressional Research, American 
Law Division, opinion on constitutionality of E.O. 12,092) [hereinafter cited as 1979 
Hearings]. 
38. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (expired). 
39. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at  490. 
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gency Price Control Act:O was enacted to limit wages and agri- 
cultural prices." In each of these Acts, Congress carefully 
defined the power being granted the President and set specific 
expiration dates? In title IV of the Defense Production Act of 
1950:' Congress again granted the President authority to con- 
trol wages and prices. This Act contained clear guidelines cir- 
cumscribing the President's authority. Congress later terminated 
the President's wage and price authority by amending the origi- 
nal act.& Later Congress passed the Economic Stabilization Act 
of 1970:' authorizing the President to issue orders and regula- 
tions deemed appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and 
salaries. Congress allowed the President's authority to expire on 
April 30, 1974? 
Between 1973 and the expiration of the wage and price con- 
trol authority granted under the Economic Stabilization Act, 
nineteen bills concerning wage and price regulation were intro- 
duced in Congress." The bills were designed to continue the Ex- 
ecutive's broad control over the economy, or more specifically, to 
extend the authorization of the Economic Stabilization Act.48 Of 
these bills, not one was voted out of the Senate  committee^.^^ 
In addition to these nineteen bills, Senator Muskie pro- 
posed a wage and price control amendment to an unrelated bill. 
The amendment would have empowered the Cost of Living 
Council to enforce decontrol agreements and given the President 
stand-by authority to reimpose controls. The Senate defeated 
the amendment by a vote of 56 to 32?O 
40. Ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (expired). 
41. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, a t  491. 
42. Id. at  491 & n.99. 
43. Ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (expired). 
44. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, ch. 530,66 Stat. 296; 1979 Hear- 
ings, supra note 37, at  491. 
45. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired). The Act was later altered by the 
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,85 Stat. 743 (1971) 
(expired). 
46. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at  491-93. Congress tightly controlled the time 
periods allowed the President to use his authority despite a Presidential request that his 
authority continue for a longer period of time. Id. at  492. 
47. Id. at 494. A list of the bills (with synopses) can be found in OFFICE OF ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION, DEP'T OF TREASURY, HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS ON THE ECONOMIC 
ST~ILIZATION PROGRAM, AUG. 15,1971 TO APB. 30,1974, PART I, at  221-23 (1974) [herein- 
after cited as HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS]; 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, a t  494 n.106. 
48. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at  494. 
49. Id. at  495. 
50. Id. 
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Besides the proposed amendment and bills seeking to ex- 
tend broad control of the economy, other bills concerning wage 
and price regulation were introduced in Congress in 1973 and 
1974. These bills included proposals to maintain controls on spe- 
cific sectors of the economy, to terminate the Economic Stabili- 
zation Act before its scheduled expiration date, and to provide 
alternative transition measures as the existing controls were 
phased out. None of these bills passed." 
In August 1974, after rejecting all of these proposals for Ex- 
ecutive economic control, Congress enacted the Council on Wage 
and Price Stability Act (COWPSA)" which provided for an ad- 
visory body to monitor wage and price activity. COWPSA con- 
tained no provision for economic sanctions; in fact, the act spe- 
cifically prohibited mandatory wage and price  control^.^ In 1979 
Congress extended COWPSA "without significant [substantive] 
modification,"" although the budget and staff allowance was 
increased. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co- 
lumbia confronted the first impression questionM of whether an 
Executive orderderiving its authority from FPASA-could re- 
quire contractors to adhere to Presidential wage and price stan- 
dards as a condition of doing business with the federal govern- 
ment." Admitting that there was a "difficult problem of 
statutory constr~ction,"~~ the majority stated that any Executive 
51. Id. at 494 n.106. A list of the bills (with synopses) is found in HISTORICAL WORK- 
ING PAPERS, supra note 47, at 223-40. 
52. Pub. L. No. 93-387,88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975,1977,1979), reprinted in 
12 U.S.C. 5 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979). 
53. Id. § 3(b). 
54. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 US. 915 
(1979). See also H.R. REP. NO. 33, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 12-13 (1979). 
55. Responding to the AFL-CIO challenge, government counsel admitted that this 
was the "first direct attempt . . . found [where the Executive used] the procurement 
power and . . . another executive agency to set wage and price guidelines through execu- 
tive orders." Transcript of Hearing on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, May 16, 
1979, at 30, quoted in AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 92-93, vacated, 618 F.2d 784 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 US. 915 (1979); see 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, a t  72 
(prepared statement of Milton J. Socolar). 
56. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 787,792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 US. 915 
(1979). 
57. Id. at 787. 
43 11 CASENOTES 439 
order based on section 205(a) of FPASAs8 must be consistent 
with the criteria of economy and efficiency.'@ The majority held 
that "[b]ecause there is a sutticiently close nexus between those 
criteria and the procurement compliance program established by 
Executive Order 12092," the program is authorized by FPASA." 
The majority found support for its holding in cases involv- 
ing analogous antidiscrimination orders that also derived their 
authority from FPASA." The majority concluded that courts 
which had dealt with equal employment Executive orders had 
found a close relationship between FPASA criteria of economy 
and efficiency and the objective of ending employment discrimi- 
nation. According to this reasoning, if wage and price standards 
encourage economy and efficiency, they would be valid under 
FPASA." Two brief concurring opinions and two longer dissent- 
ing opinions accompanied the majority opinion.6s 
The correctness of the majority's holding that E.O. 12,092 is 
a proper exercise of Presidential authority depends upon the di- 
rective's conformity to "congressional intent" in the area of wage 
and price regulation? Some courts upholding the antidis- 
58. 40 U.S.C. 5 486(a) (1976). 
59. 618 F.2d a t  792. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at  790-92. 
62. Id. at 792. The majority decided that the Council on Wage and Price Stability 
Act does not bar E.O. 12,092. Id. at  794-96. Also, the majority summarily dismissed the 
contention that E.O. 12,092 contravenes the congressional policy of free collective bar- 
gaining. Id. at  796. 
63. Two brief concurring opinions stressed the "close nexus" between E.O. 12,092 
and the goal of FPASA to achieve economy and efficiency. Id. at  796-97 (Bazelon, J., and 
Tamm, J., concurring). The first dissenting opinion strongly contended that the majority 
position was: (1) unrelated to the congressional purpose of FPASA and other wage and 
price measures, id. at  799-800, 808-09 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); (2) inconsistent with 
explicit provisions of the 1949 Act, id. at  800-03; (3) unlikely to provide economy to the 
government, id. at  803-08; and (4) unresponsive to the constitutional barrier to excessive 
delegation to the President, id. at 811-14. The second dissenting opinion found that E.O. 
12,092 was impermissibly mandatory, outside the scope of the FPASA, unsupported by 
the antidiscrimination Executive orders, and banned by COWPSA. Id. at  816-19 (Robb, 
J., dissenting.) 
64. The President must conform to congressional intent since the power to control 
wages and prices is a congressional power. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 
(1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); F.P.C. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 
U.S. 575, 582 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941); United States v. 
Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533,571 (1939); 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at  
476 (Congressional Research, American Law Division opinion). 
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crimination orders found that the congressional intent behind 
FPASA may be satisfied upon a finding that the order promotes 
economy and efficiency in federal proc~rement.~~ If the courts 
uphold Executive orders that are as tenuously linked to FPASA 
goals of economy and efficiency as the antidiscrimination orders, 
then the wage-price order must also be valid under FPASA:'j 
However, the facts in the instant case can be distinguished 
in three respects from those in the antidiscrimination cases re- 
lied upon by the majority: (1) the inconsistency with section 
502(d) of FPASA, (2) the applicability of the East Texas excep- 
tion, and (3) the inadequacy of congressional ratification. 
A. Inconsistency with Section 502(d) 
Even if E.O. 12,092 might promote some economy and effi- 
ciency, FPASA cannot be used to uphold it if the order violates 
provisions of FPASA itself. Section 205(a) of FPASA states that 
"[tlhe President may prescribe such policies and directives, not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as he shall deem 
necessary to effectuate the provisions of said 
E.O. 12,092 appears inconsistent with section 502(d) of 
FPASA because it will alter a wage and price "stabilization" 
program. Section 502(d) provides: 
Nothing in this Act shall impair or affect any authority o f .  . . 
(2) any executive agency with respect to any phase (including, 
but not limited to, procurement . . .) of any program con- 
ducted for purposes of resale, price support, grants to farmers, 
stabilization, transfer to foreign governments, or foreign aid, 
relief, or rehabilitation . . . . 08 
Three points support the conclusion that E.O. 12,092 is inconsis- 
tent with section 502(d): (1) the word "stabilization" in section 
502(d) refers to wage and price programs, (2) the words "impair 
or affect" in section 502(d) prohibit alteration of a "stabiliza- 
tion" program, and (3) E.O. 12,092 does alter a current stabiliza- 
The majority appears to agree that regulating wages and prices is a congressional 
power, as did the appellants. 618 F.2d at 787. The first dissent also agreed with this 
point. Id. at 798 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
65. See notes 24-34 and accompanying text supra. 
66. 618 F.2d at 792. Reliance upon FPASA to uphold the antidiscrimination orders 
has often been criticized as construing the Act too broadly. See, e-g., J. Remmert, E.O. 
11,246: Executive Encroachment, 55 A.B.A. J .  1037 (1969). 
67. 40 U.S.C. 3 &(a) (1976) (emphasis added). 
68. Id. 3 474 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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tion program-COWPSA. 
First, the word "stabilization" in section 502(d) refers to 
wage and price regulation. The majority suggests that the word 
stabilization refers only to "farm commodity support programs 
. . . without any direct relevance for procurement policy gener- 
ally."6@ However, section 502(d) clearly indicates that FPASA 
cannot impair or affect "stabili~ation."~~ The words "price sup- 
port" and "grants to farmers" are set apart from stabilization, 
implying that stabilization refers to a different program." The 
majority and dissent leave the meaning of stabilization unset- 
tled, although the dissent points out that the word stabilization 
refers to price controls in the 1942 Price Control Act.72 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that Congress used the 
word stabilization to refer to wage and price controls. In 1942 
Congress passed the Stabilization Act which specifically empow- 
ered the President to control workers' wages as well as agricul- 
tural prices.?' Since the 1949 FPASA was enacted shortly after 
the expiration of this Act it can be inferred that Congress used 
the same word to refer to wage and price standards. Congress 
has used the term "stabilization" or "stability" to refer directly 
to other wage and price control programs, such as the 1950 De- 
fense Act title on Price and Wage Stabilization," the 1970 Eco- 
nomic Stabilization Act," and the 1974 Council on Wage and 
Price Stability Act.'. 
Second, the meaning of "impair or affect" in section 502(d) 
of FPASAT7 is most reasonably interpreted to prohibit any ac- 
tion under FPASA which significantly alters a stabilization 
agency or program, whether by obstructing it or by greatly ex- 
panding its power. The majority states that even if the word sta- 
bilization refers to wage and price controls, section 502(d) only 
indicates that the President shall not "obstruct" a "stabilization 
69. 618 F.2d at 789 11-24. 
70. 40 U.S.C. $ 474 (1976). 
71. 618 F.2d at 801 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
72. Id. 
73. The Stabilization Act of 1942, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (expired), was effective dur- 
ing much of the 1940's. 
74. Ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798, 803 (1950) (expired). 
75. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84,Stat. 799 (1970) (expired). 
76. Pub. L. No. 93-387,88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975,1977,1979), reprinted in 
12 U.S.C. $ 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979). 
77. 40 U.S.C. $ 474 (1976). 
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program."78 Nevertheless, the clear wording of section 502(d) 
says that any action taken under FPASA shall not impair or af- 
fect, not merely avoid obstruction. It seems much more reasona- 
ble to conclude that the words "or affect" mean any significant 
alteration of a stabilization program, whether by obstructing it 
or by expanding its powers:9 particularly in the context of the 
instant case in which the President attempted to expand Execu- 
tive authority. 
Finally, E.O. 12,092 significantly alters an existing stabiliza- 
tion program, the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act 
(COWPSA).80 Permitting the President to disqualify contractors 
who do not comply with wage and price standards from federal 
contracts substantially affects the voluntary nature of 
COWPSA's guidelines by providing its administrators with lev- 
erage they would not otherwise have-the power to set wages 
and prices and have them enforced by the Office of Federal Pro- 
curement Policy. COWPSA simply created a program and au- 
thorized administrators to monitor the economy and set volun- 
tary guidelines without the use of economic sanctions. E.O. 
12,092, however, alters the impact of COWPSA's recommended 
guidelines by providing procurement sanctions against firms 
that do not comply. Therefore, the Executive order greatly af- 
fects the previously voluntary COWPSA guidelines. 
The majority in the instant case failed to distinguish be- 
tween E.O. 12,092, which violates section 502(d), and the anti- 
discrimination orders, which do not. The antidiscrimination or- 
ders do not represent a stabilization program, nor any of the 
other programs that a President may not "impair or affect" 
under section 502(d) of FPASA. Thus, even though E.O. 12,092 
may promote the same policy of economy and efficiency as the 
antidiscrimination orders, E.O. 12,092 cannot be upheld on the 
78. 618 F.2d at 789 n.24. 
79. There is simply no basis for converting the verb "affect" into the verb "ob- 
struct." The dictionary defines "to affect" as "to produce an effect upon" or 
"to produce a material influence upon or alteration in." Webster's New Col- 
legiate Dictionary 19 (1977). I t  is fundamental that the plain and ordinary 
meaning of statutory language controls. . . . Section 502(d) provides that 
nothing in the 1949 Act shall produce an effect upon, influence, or alter any 
stabilization program. The President's Order is in violation of that prohibition, 
and it is therefore unlawful. 
618 F.2d at  801 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
80. Pub. L. No. 93-387,88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975,1977,1979), reprinted in 
12 U.S.C. 8 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979). 
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basis of FPASA since the directive is inconsistent with provi- 
sions of that Act. 
B. The East Texas Exception 
Executive orders are only valid if consistent with the con- 
gressional statutes covering the same subject matter." The ma- 
jority cited some cases that upheld Executive antidiscrimination 
orders under FPASA, but failed to discuss United States v. East 
Texas Motor Freight System, I ~ C . , ~ ~  an important case that lim- 
its the authority of the Executive to issue antidiscrimination or- 
ders. The Fifth Circuit in East Texas looked to congressional 
antidiscrimination statutes to determine whether an Executive 
order could be used to invalidate a bona fide seniority system. 
Noting the exemption for bona fide seniority systems in title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the court invalidated the use of the 
Executive antidiscrimination order to disturb the system.8s 
Thus, the application of an Executive order will be invalidated 
to the extent that it conflicts with congressional intent. 
To determine whether E.O. 12,092 is consistent with con- 
gressional intent concerning wage and price regulation, the legis- 
lative background of wage and price regulation must be carefully 
analyzed. The inquiry will be broken into two parts: (1) the 
Presidential authority to control wage and price regulation that 
Congress has terminated or rejected, and (2) the authority Con- 
gress granted the President under COWPSA. If E.O. 12,092 is 
found to be inconsistent with congressional intent, it should be 
invalidated as was the antidiscrimination order in East Texas. 
1. Congress has Terminated or Rejected Presidential Author- 
ity for Economic Sanctions 
Both the congressional termination of any statutes explicitly 
granting Presidential authority to control wages and prices by 
economic sanctions and the recent rejection of several attempts 
to grant the President that power strongly suggest that eco- 
nomic sanctions run contrary to congressional intent. E.O. 
12,092 instituted the economic sanctions that Congress either 
terminated or rejected. As noted earlier, any explicit grant of au- 
thority to the President to control wages and prices by economic 
81. See notes 37 & 64 supra. 
82. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977). 
83. Id. at 185. 
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sanction has been terminated by Congress." The Emergency 
Price Control Act of 1942,85 the Stabilization Act of 1942," title 
IV of the Defense Production Act of 1950,8' and the Economic 
Stabilization Act of 197OS8 have all been ended by Congress. 
Congress tightly controlled the type of Presidential authority it 
granted by express statute and imposed strict time limits for the 
exercise of the power granted to the Executive. Congress' pur- 
pose in terminating the statutes was to remove Presidential 
power to control wages and prices. 
Furthermore, Congress clearly voiced its intent to deny Ex- 
ecutive control when it rejected more than nineteen bills and 
one amendment attempting to give the Executive power to regu- 
late wages and prices through economic  sanction^.^^ This legisla- 
tive history indicates that Congress has been unwilling to allow 
the President to impose further economic controls in any 
manner.e0 
2. The Current CO WPSA Provides Presidential Power to Is- 
sue "Purely Voluntary" Guidelines 
The current congressional statute concerning wage and 
price regulation grants the President power to issue and monitor 
purely voluntary wage and price guidelines, but in no way grants 
power to impose economic sanctions. Congress passed COWPSA 
in August of 1974 after having rejected a wide variety of bills 
proposing different types of economic sanctions that could be 
imposed by the President..' COWPSA established an advisory 
body to monitor wage and price levels. The legislation clearly 
banned any type of "mandatory control" that might be at- 
tempted under the Act.@= 
Since Congress' most recent action in the area of wage and 
price controls, COWPSA, was to grant the President power to 
monitor the economy without imposing sanctions, the Presi- 
84. See notes 38-51 and accompanying text supra. 
85. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (expired). 
86. Ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (expired). 
87. Ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (expired). 
88. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired). 
89. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at 494-95. 
90. Brief for Appellee at 8-9, AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
91. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at 494-95. 
92. Pub. L. No. 93-387, 5 3(b), 88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975, 1977, 1979), re- 
printed in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979). 
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dent's actions should be evaluated in the context of this Act? 
COWPSA contains an affirmative congressional policy to leave 
control of wages and prices to the free market," rather than to 
invoke Presidential wage-price sanctions. The scope of authority 
granted the President by COWPSA was defined by the bill's 
sponsor, Senator Tower: 
The proposed council, the Council on Wage and Price Sta- 
bility, would have the power to monitor the economy, work 
with labor and management to improve the structure of collec- 
tive bargaining and encourage price restraint . . . . 
I approach this legislation with some amount of apprehen- 
sion for many may perceive the action which we take today to 
be the first step back toward controls. If this view is pervasive, 
it could further exacerbate our inflationary problem by stimu- 
lating anticipatory wage and price increases and hence further 
the prospect of imposition of future controls. Congress must 
demonstrate that this is not our intent. No economic author- 
ity is being granted or authorized. The Senate clearly demon- 
strated its opinion toward extending any form of economic 
controls by defeating such a measure overwhelmingly on May 
9, 1974,56-32. . . . [The purpose of this bill is] merely to mon- 
itor the economy as a whole in cooperation with public and pri- 
vate agencies and not to reestablish an income policy. . . .s6 
Senator Tower explained that COWPSA was not to be used 
,top the free market from determining wage and price levels: 
The provisions embodied in the Council on Wage and 
Price Stability Act of 1974 represent a license by the Congress 
to the President to exercise his influence to arrest the inflation- 
ary spiral. To this end I believe we should draw the line on 
acceptable amendments to this legislation where the disci- 
93. Legal Times of Washington, July 9, 1979, a t  15, col. 1. The majority found that 
COWPSA did not invalidate E.O. 12,092. The majority felt the language of 3(b) of 
COWPSA, providing that "[njothing in this Act . . . authorizes . . . mandatory eco- 
nomic controls," did not bar the President from imposing economic sanctions through a 
different Executive agency, OFPP, than the Council established under COWPSA. The 
majority concluded this was valid because E.O. 12,092 derived its authority from FPASA, 
not COWPSA. 618 F.2d a t  795. 
94. The sponsor of COWPSA defined what he felt would be an unacceptable en- 
croachment upon the "free market" when he stated: "I believe we should draw the line 
on acceptable amendments to this legislation where the discipline of an agency or a 
council of the Federal Government begins to replace the discipline of the marketplace. 
The discipline of the marketplace should be the final arbitrator of wages and prices." 120 
CONG. REC. 28,883 (1974) (remarks of Senator Tower). 
95. Id. (emphasis added). 
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pline of an agency or a council of the Federal Government 
begins to replace the discipline of the marketplace. The disci- 
pline of the marketplace should be the final arbitrator of 
wages and prices. . . . 
It has also been suggested that the President be given the 
authority to demand information from all sectors of the econ- 
omy through the issuance of subpenas. The President of the 
United States has not asked for this authority, nor does he 
want it. The power to subpena further infringes on the free 
market system and hence should be re je~ ted .@~ 
COWPSA's legislative history points out that the ban on 
"mandatory economic controls" extends to any executive eco- 
nomic sanctions that .would interfere with the operation of the 
free market. The sponsors of COWPSA, who regarded even the 
executive enforcement of subpoenas to be inconsistent with the 
free market system, would have rejected any suggestion that the 
Executive could impose procurement sanctions on federal gov- 
ernment contractors. 
In E.O. 12,092 the President employs COWPSA as the 
mechanism for declaring wage and price standards and enforcing 
compliance through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. 
This action goes far beyond the congressional intent in 
COWPSA to grant the President authority to encourage purely 
voluntary wage and price restraint." COWPSA's sponsor specifi- 
cally stated that a federal agency or council should not displace 
the free market.e8 E.O. 12,092 is invalid because it attaches 
strong economic penalties to COWPSA guidelines and displaces 
the free market as the arbitrator of wages and prices for federal 
contractors. 
The rule illustrated by United States v. East Texas Motor 
Freight System, 'Inc.@@ is that the application of an Executive 
order will be invalidated to the extent it conflicts with congres- 
sional intent.loO When Congress rejected more than nineteen 
bills attempting to grant the President some authority to control 
wages and prices, Congress demonstrated its intent to deny the 
President any authority to use economic sanctions. Congress en- 
96. Id. (emphasis added). 
97. Legal Times of Washington, July 9, 1979, at 15, col. 1-2; Brief for Appellee at 7- 
9, AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
98. 120 CONG. REC. 28,883 (1974) (remarks of Senator Tower). 
99. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977). 
100. Id. at 185. 
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acted COWPSA to provide only for Executive issuance and 
monitoring of voluntary means of influencing wages and prices. 
Since E.O. 12,092 implements economic sanctions and displaces 
the free market by setting limits on Federal contractors' wages 
and prices, it is governed by the East Texas exception. 
C. Congress Has Not Ratified E.0. 12,092 
The antidiscrimination orders that the majority relied upon 
were ratified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 19641°1 and 
the later Equal Employment Opportunity Amendments,lo2 but 
Congress has not ratified E.O. 12,092. The majority opinion does 
not adequately consider this important difference between the 
antidiscrimination orders and the wage-price order. 
In United States v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,lo3 the 
Fifth Circuit explained: 
At the least, there has been implied congressional approval of 
the [Executive antidiscrimination order] programs; it can even 
be argued that there has been express ratification. . . . 
. . . .  
The second source of legislative authorization is Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . A reference in the Act, as 
originally enacted, id. 2000(e)-8(d), to the Executive Order pro- 
gram indicated congressional intent that the program would 
continue in existence.'"' 
101. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 5 709(d), 78 Stat. 241 (current version at  42 U.S.C. 5 2000e 
(1976)). 
102. See Pub. L. No. 92-261,86 Stat. 103 (1972) (current version a t  42 U.S.C. 2000e 
(1976)). 
103. 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978). 
104. Id. at 466-67. The court added that "[ojther aspects of the Act which were 
enacted into law illustrate congressional contemplation of the program's [authorized by 
antidiscrimination order] continuance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. $5 2000e-14, 2000e-17." Id. at  
467. They went on to state that, "[tjhe regulation in controversy is an integral part of a 
long-standing program [Executive antidiscrimination orders] which Congress has recog- 
nized and approved. We have no difEculty, therefore, in finding congressional authoriza- 
tion for the provision." Id.; see AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 96-98 (D.D.C.), va- 
cated, AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). 
In Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 854 (1971), the court also found the Executive antidiscrimination order involved 
to be upheld by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court noted that the reference in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to Executive orders relating to fair employment practices for 
government contractors indicated that Congress contemplated continuance of the Execu- 
tive order programs. Indeed, as Congress has not prohibited presidential action in the 
area of employment on federal or federally assisted contracts, the President is bound by 
the express prohibitions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 dealing with discrimi- 
nation in employment. Id. a t  171-74. 
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In addition, the majority opinion in the instant case ignored the 
subsequent ratification of the substantive content of the antidis- 
crimination orders in the 1972 amendments to title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, even though the lower court carefully con- 
sidered the point.lo6 
In contrast to the antidiscrimination orders, Congress has 
not ratified E.O. 12,092. Simply because Congress extended 
COWPSA after E.O. 12,092 was issued does not mean Congress 
ratified E.O. 12,092's compliance sanctions. lo6 The instant case 
was pending in court when COWPSA was extended, and Con- 
gress expected the courts to resolve the legal questions sur- 
rounding E.O. 12,092.1°7 The only statements made by Congress 
concerning the validity of E.O. 12,092 explicitly denied any in- 
tention to influence the suit. For example, the House committee 
which handled the extension noted that the committee "did not 
seek to resolve [the controversy] on the issue of whether the Ex- 
ecutive . . . has exceeded the authority granted by Congres~."~~~ 
105. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88,96-98 (D.D.C.), vacated, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). A series of amendments designed to curb the 
Executive antidiscrimination order programs were defeated by Congress. See 118 CONG. 
REC. 1664, 1676,4918 (1972). The House Report on the 1972 title VII amendments indi- 
cates congressional support for the Executive antidiscrimination program. See H.R. REP. 
No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1971). See also United States v. New Orleans Public 
Service, Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977). vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 
(1978) (court explains how the 1972 amendments support the antidiscrimination orders); 
Legal Times of Washington, July 9, 1979 a t  13, col. 2-3. 
106. The majority was persuaded that Congress' 1979 extension of COWPSA with- 
out significant modification, but with knowledge of the pending suit in the District 
Court, was evidence that Congress did not intend COWPSA to bar the wage and price 
procurement sanctions. The majority apparently found that the COWPSA extension in- 
dicated tacit approval of E.O. 12,092. Particularly important to the majority was the 
increased funding and st& given to COWPSA. 618 F.2d a t  795-96. 
The majority's conclusion might be questioned by the United States Supreme Court 
decisions which have held that the failure of Congress to change a statute after an inter- 
pretation by the Executive branch is a poor guide to congressional intent. See e.g., Zuber 
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d a t  815 n.* (D.C. Cir.) (MacK- 
innon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). 
107. 618 F.2d at 809 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
108. H.R. REP. NO. 33, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979); 125 CONG. REC. H2322 (daily 
ed. Apr. 25, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead). See also Brief for Amici Curiae, AFL- 
CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979). (three Senators and twenty-one Representa- 
tives of the House expressly deny the legality of E.O. 12,092 in this brief); Legal Times of 
Washington, July 9,1979, a t  15, col. 2; 124 CONG. REC. S16781 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1978) 
(a Sense of the Senate resolution passed before E.O. 12,092 expressing the view that 
neither the 1949 FPASA nor any other statute allowed the President to impose a pro- 
gram of mandatory wage and price controls). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The majority in AFL-CIO v. Kahn misapplied the analogy 
of the antidiscrimination orders by misinterpreting congres- 
sional intent in the area of wage and price regulation. Although 
E.O. 12,092 might promote FPASA policies of economy and effi- 
ciency, three distinctions separate the wage-price situation from 
the antidiscrimination cases relied upon by the majority. First, 
E.O. 12,092 is inconsistent with section 502(d) of FPASA. Sec- 
tion 205(a) of FPASA prohibits the President from taking any 
action "inconsistent" with other FPASA provisions. E.O. 12,092 
is inconsistent with section 502(d)'s prohibition against affecting 
a wage and price stabilization program because it alters the 
purely voluntary nature of the current COWPSA guidelines. 
Second, E.O. 12,092 should be governed by United States u. 
East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc.,lO@ which held that ap- 
plications of an Executive order that run contrary to congres- 
sional intent will be invalidated. A review of the wage and price 
statutes Congress has terminated or rejected indicates Congress' 
desire to avoid giving the President any power to impose eco- 
nomic sanctions. The legislative background of COWPSA clearly 
shows that Congress intended the power granted the President 
to be strictly limited to issuing voluntary guidelines that do not 
impose economic sanctions. To the extent that E.O. 12,092 pro- 
vides economic sanctions, it is contrary to congressional intent. 
Third, E.O. 12,092 has not been ratified by Congress. The appli- 
cation of the antidiscrimination orders relied upon by the major- 
ity were ratified by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1972 
amendments, but Congress has expressly denied any intention of 
ratifying E.O. 12,092. For these three reasons E.O. 12,092 should 
have been invalidated. 
James W. Stewart 
109. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977). 
